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Preface
America's Air Force Vision 2020 stresses the role of Air Force core competencies as building blocks for the effective utilization of aerospace power. Recently, the capability to effectively execute one of our competencies, Rapidly Global Mobility, has witnessed intense scrutiny at the national level. There is a growing concern over an apparent airlift shortfall to meet our wartime requirements. The National Command Authority relies heavily on Air Mobility Command's ability to support rapid combat power projection.
For two years, from 1998-2000, I had the privilege of supporting a major piece of our national power projection puzzle, the 82 nd Airborne Division Ready Brigade from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Outload of the division occurs on the world famous -green ramp," located on Pope Air Force Base (AFB) (collocated with Fort Bragg). During this time, I developed an intense respect for the troopers of the 82 nd as they shuffled day after day, night after night, through rain, bitter cold and stifling heat, to awaiting aircraft on green ramp. This paper is a tribute to them, as well as to the airlifters who support them.
I owe a debt of gratitude to many people for their support during the past several months of research and writing. A heartfelt thanks to my wife Mary, and my children Scott and Naneva, for their patience and understanding. Additionally, Capt Dominic Clementz of the 743d
Maintenance Squadron provided invaluable assistance in obtaining information direct from green ramp. Finally, a special thanks to my advisor, Lt Col Ladonna Idell, not only for her support, but also for expecting nothing less than 100 percent.
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Abstract
Upon receiving a call from the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters, the 82 nd Airborne
Division issues an alert order to the on-call Division Ready Brigade (DRB). Within 18-hours of initial notification, elements of the brigade must be in the air. Success of the DRB depends on the Air Force core competency of rapid global mobility. Several years have passed since the National Command Authority (NCA) deployed the DRB in support of vital national interests.
During this time, the military experienced a significant reduction in personnel, decline in forward presence, and problems associated with aging weapon systems. Understandably, issues such as these cause concern over Air Mobility Command's (AMC) readiness to support the DRB.
Outload of the DRB occurs on green ramp, located at Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North
Carolina. AMC, most notably the 43d Operations Group (OG) outload operations section, 3d
Aerial Port Squadron (APS), and 743d Maintenance Squadron (MXS), provide most of this support. Are these units poised to support the DRB if a call came from the NCA today? This paper will address the DRB support requirements for these organizations, current methods for determining their readiness to meet these requirements (surprisingly inadequate), and conclude with recommendations for improvement.
The Air University Library, located at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, provided a majority of the research assistance and information for this project. Additionally, internet resources proved invaluable in providing background materials, technical data, and access to periodicals and local newspapers. Finally, the author relied heavily on personal experience, and the advice and
Introduction
Force does not exist for mobility, but mobility for force.
-Alfred Thayer Mahan
Tucked quietly away in a corner of the Pope Air Force Base (AFB) flightline, is the world famous -green ramp," described as a precious national asset by one recent wing commander. 2 This causes significant concern regarding our ability to support national security objectives. A vital readiness concern directly related to this issue is the ability of AMC units at Pope AFB to effectively support the 18-hour contingency deployment requirement for the DRB. The Air Force provides DRB airlift support in the form of Strategic Brigade Airdrop (SBA).
The Mission
Outload of the DRB occurs on green ramp. Pope AFB has been an asset of AMC since its transfer from Air Combat Command on 1 April 1997. Before the transfer, the 624 th AMSG provided primary support to the DRB. This organization consisted of three primary elements:
command and control, 3d APS, and the 624 th MXS, operating under the umbrella of the AMC enroute system. Currently, support for the DRB is provided by the 43d OG en route support section, 3d APS, and the 743d MXS. Despite maintaining similarities in organizational structure, the transition from ACC to AMC had an adverse affect on determining readiness to support the DRB. This will be discussed in chapters four and five.
Recent Operations
Joint Vision 2020 continues to stress the importance of overseas basing in meeting our national security objectives, but places greater emphasis on continental United States (CONUS) based power projection capabilities. 6 The effectiveness of the DRB during recent operations reinforces current operational concepts espoused by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Two of the more notable conflicts supported by the 82 nd DRB were Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. A brief overview of these operations provides a good point of reference before addressing issues affecting readiness on green ramp.
Operation JUST CAUSE
On 17 December 1989, an alert order was transmitted to the 82 nd utilizing an Emergency Readiness Deployment Exercise (EDRE) as deception cover. The rapidly deteriorating situation in Panama had convinced the National Command Authority that it was time to act. The final Air
Force package supporting the DRB portion of outload operations on green ramp consisted of 51 C-141 aircraft (20 personnel, 28 heavy equipment, and 3 Container Delivery System (CDS) aircraft). There were minor problems during the initial phases of the deployment, compounded by the fact that the DRB had just changed from the 3d, to the 1 st Brigade. However, the DRB was loaded within 24 hours, with the first aircraft fully loaded in 10 hours. 7 In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the air assault of Panama began, to include over 30 C-130 and C-141 aircraft dropping airborne troops. The success of the DRB concept during the two operations discussed above is well documented and hard to dispute. However, the simple reality that the United States military does not currently maintain the same robust capabilities that it did a decade ago is also hard to dispute.
Limitations of This Study
Not surprisingly, the force reductions and other developments of the past ten years resulted in significant changes to the organizations on green ramp. Consequently, the question arises; can these units still provide the required support for the DRB? In fact, do we even have a current system in place to measure the readiness of these units? These two questions represent the focus of this study.
Weapon systems procurement and aircrew training/availability represent two issues not addressed by this study. These vital topics require separate research. Finally, the DRB continues to stand ready to conduct forced-entry operations 18-hours from a cold start. In an era characterized by smaller force structures and an aging airlift fleet, the airmen of green ramp must ensure the DRB can effectively answer the call in support of national security objectives. other support requirements at Pope AFB for organizations supporting operations on green ramp.
Clear identification of these requirements will help ensure development of effective methods to determine readiness to support the DRB. 
Heavy Equipment
The Heavy Equipment (HE) delivery system is capable of delivering larger and/or heavier loads than the CDS system. With HE airdrops, the user is responsible for rigging the loads, a labor-intensive process, which requires specialized materials. In contrast to the CDS method, however, HE requires significant MHE capability. Both the C-130 and C-141 are capable of delivering loads up to 42,500 pounds with the HE method. The C-17 can deliver up to 60,000 pounds using HE airdrop.
Airland
Aircraft utilizing the airland method land at the forward operating location and unload cargo and personnel. Airland is the safest and most efficient delivery method in terms of cargo delivered, and availability for return cargo. However, the goal of the 82 nd is to be on the ground in 30 minutes. In contrast to airborne delivery, the airland method takes approximately 29 hours to deploy the DRB. 6 The C-130, C-17, C-141, and C-5 are all capable of utilizing the airland method. Of note, C-5 SBA testing was conducted at Pope AFB in the mid-1990s using personnel airdrop, CDS, and HE delivery methods. However, the C-5 does not currently provide support to these three missions.
Current DRB Airdrop Requirements
The DRB requirement in fiscal year 1997 consisted of a formation of 64 C-141 aircraft broken down as follows: 24 personnel, 38 HE, and 2 CDS, with a 27-minute pass time. 
Station Capability
Maximum on Ground (MOG) and Hot Spot aircraft parking capability represent two key areas affecting station capability. MOG is the maximum number of aircraft (of a given weapon system) that personnel can work simultaneously. MOG is based on several factors, to include parking ramp space, maintenance servicing, and cargo loading capability. MOG can be improved through personnel augmentation and freeing up parking ramp space. For example, utilizing the entire airfield at Pope increases aircraft parking MOG to the following numbers: 63 C-141, 25 C-5 aircraft, or 61 C-17 aircraft.
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Hot Spot parking is another issue affecting station capability. Safety concerns preclude aircraft transporting explosives (hot cargo) from parking near facilities or major thoroughfares.
There are four primary hot cargo parking spots on Pope, all located across the runway from green ramp. These parking locations are sited for items such as 105mm ammunition, blasting caps, C-4, flares, and small arms ammunition. 12 Additional parking spots on green ramp are sited for 1.3 and 1.4 net explosive weight items, such as flares and some small arms ammunition. Chapter 3
Aerial Port/Aircraft Maintenance
En route Support Structure
Through mobility we conquer.
-Motto, The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, c. 1930 AMC defines the en route system as, -an interdependent global network of manpower, material, and facilities that provide command and control, maintenance, and aerial port services to air mobility forces performing AMC worldwide missions." 1 With the dissolution of the 624 th AMSG in 1997, Pope AFB ceased to function as an en route. Despite changes in manpower and organizational structure, the green ramp mission continued relatively unchanged. Interestingly, the functions of the organizations supporting this mission continue to mirror those that define the AMC en route system.
Command and Control
The 624 th AMSG utilized 44 manpower authorizations to accomplish the command and control function on green ramp. The current organizational structure reduced this number to 23. AMC also plans to procure 264 Next Generation Small Loaders (NGSL), as the remaining 25K
loaders reach the end of useful service.
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AMC en route units are traditionally considered forward deployed for their wartime tasking, ensuring the rapid transport of personnel, equipment, combat forces, and supplies around the globe. When the 624 th AMSG ceased to exist, most of the rules normally applied to the en route system were no longer applicable to green ramp operations. As such, 3 APS currently supports a Designated Operational Capability (DOC) statement, which requires the capability to conduct an aerial rapid deployment operation during a contingency or humanitarian relief operation. When AMC tasks 3 APS for deployment overseas, much of the capability honed through daily training with the 82 nd Airborne Division goes with it. When this happens the 53 APS, a reserve unit also stationed at Pope AFB, fills the gap. This unit also has the advantage of training with the Army for the past several decades. As an operation continues, additional active duty and reserve units provide augmentation in terms of personnel, JAI qualified loadmasters, and MHE. 
Determining Readiness
The man who is prepared has his battle half fought. 
Air Mobility Command
The AMC inspection program forms the basis for determining readiness to respond anywhere around the globe on short notice, as part of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) Philosophically, AMC uses a combination of these methods to determine mission readiness on green ramp.
Stand Alone Exercises
The stand-alone exercise is a valuable tool utilized by the AMC IG. For example, 3 APS could deploy to Dover AFB, Delaware, and provide support to the 436 th APS during a peak workload period. However, the focus is more on measuring deployment capability, and less on home station missions, such as supporting outload operations on green ramp. For example, 743
MXS personnel do not maintain currency for mobility. Unit members do not possess required equipment, or receive training beyond initial mobility qualification. Consequently, they are not susceptible to a stand-alone exercise tasking. Exercises of this type are useful for measuring the readiness of a unit to deploy in support of a contingency, but not for determining readiness of Pope units to support outload of the DRB on green ramp.
Expeditionary Operational Readiness Inspection (EORI)
The IG uses an EORI to evaluate the ability of a unit to meet its wartime tasking. Although the concept of the IGX has applicability, AMC has not directly utilized this program to determine readiness on green ramp. 3 APS is susceptible to the IGX concept, and is required to participate based on assigned UTCs. However, readiness requirements measured during an IGX primarily reflect their wartime deployment role. As previously stated, the 743d
does not have a mobility commitment, nor does it support any UTCs. Consequently, the unit is not currently subject to an IGX inspection. Applicability to the command and control aspect of green ramp operations is also minimal.
En Route Readiness Inspections (ERI)
In 1997, Pope AFB ceased to function as an en route in the eyes of AMC and, consequently, the 43 AW is not currently susceptible to an ERI. However, the purpose of an ERI is to,
-evaluate a unit's ability to move passengers and cargo effectively and expeditiously through the Defense Transportation System (DTS)." 8 Major graded areas include readiness, aerial port, logistics, and command and control, all applicable to the three primary green ramp support units.
Readiness evaluates the ability to move cargo and personnel to meet deployment requirements, and to -effectively transition from peacetime to contingency/wartime operations."
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The aerial port grading criteria evaluates the ability of the air terminal in support of aircraft, cargo, and passengers. Aircraft maintenance and supply support for all AMC en route aircraft represent the primary focus of logistics grading criteria. Finally, the command and control function stresses, -effective decision making, direction, coordination, execution, and reporting of deployment and readiness activities." 10 Consequently, the ERI concept is ideally suited for determining the readiness of 3 APS, the 743 MXS, and outload operations command and control elements.
AF
The 43 acres on what is currently Fort Bragg. 13 Pope AFB requires assistance from 21 AF and AMC to ensure organizations supporting operations on green ramp receive commensurate improvements.
SITREPS and Video Tele-conferences
During a Significant JA/ATT, the AMC mission commander drafts a SITREP at the end of each day's flying activity. This report is a concise recapitulation of events throughout the entire day. Included is statistical data on actual versus planned airdrops, and any issues associated with the aircraft loading, launch, and recovery process. The mission commander transmits the SITREP to the 21 AF/CC, providing an opportunity for immediate, as well as post-event,
feedback. Additionally, the 21 AF/CC normally chairs a video-teleconference with all major players as soon as practical after the event to ensure constructive feedback is provided prior to the next Significant JA/ATT. These initiatives represent invaluable tools for determining readiness to support the DRB.
Base Level Units
The 
The Army
The EDRE represents one of the primary tools used by the Army to determine readiness to execute the mission. It allows the division to test the 18-hour deployment concept by executing the tasking with no notice. In fact, the DRB normally does not know if the alert call is an EDRE or a real-world contingency. The exercise is beneficial for determining Air Force readiness as well, although key personnel assigned as -trusted agents" are in-briefed early in the process.
Organizations supporting green ramp operations receive early notification to ensure availability of adequate support.
Current Readiness
This chapter addressed several different methods for determining readiness at different organizational levels. Theoretically, the tools discussed here should provide senior leadership with a clear picture of the current state of readiness to support the DRB on green ramp.
However, upon closer review it becomes apparent that there is no process in-place to determine readiness to support DRB outload operations at Pope AFB. The next chapter will provide recommendations to correct this oversight.
Chapter 5 Recommendations
Every unit that is not supported is a defeated unit.
-Maurice de Saxe, 1732
The DRB outload support mission is unique to Pope AFB. Many rules, regulations, and procedures normally associated with AMC (and AMC gained) units are not applicable to green ramp operations. Maintaining the capability to project timely combat power around the globe necessitates a nonstandard approach to ensuring readiness. Possible areas of improvement include regulatory guidance, organizational structure, inspection criteria, conduct of exercises, and training, equipment, and personnel.
Regulatory Guidance
When Pope AFB belonged to ACC, the 624 AMSG functioned as an AMC en route tenant 
Organizational Structure
The primary organizations providing support to the DRB are aligned in different Groups within the 43 AW. The Deputy Commander for Joint Operations has coordination and oversight responsibilities with these organizations, but no formal authority. Interestingly, the nature of the mission, combined with the capabilities of supporting units, is ideally suited for the AMC en route organizational structure. The en route system is designed to support aircraft transiting the European and Pacific theaters, and consequently, there are no CONUS en route organizations.
However, this organizational structure worked well at Pope, until it fell by the wayside when the base realigned under AMC. 
Inspections
The current organizational structure for outload support on green ramp does not lend itself to evaluation under the AMC inspection system. In fact, the 743d Maintenance Squadron is not currently in the database of the AMC IG as an inspected unit. The EORI concept can measure the ability of 3 APS to forward deploy, but is not geared towards measuring home station outload support readiness. By contrast, the AMC ERI is an ideal tool for measuring readiness to support the DRB mission. However, Pope is not currently susceptible to an AMC ERI inspection.
Obviously, establishment of an AMSG at Pope would solve this problem. However, even if this does not happen, AMC should consider developing guidance to inspect the outload support mission based on the ERI concept.
Exercises
In one sense, capabilities on green ramp are tested, on average, at least once a month. 
Training, Equipment, and Personnel
Operational requirements must be clearly defined to ensure effective training. With the imminent retirement of the C-141, the C-17 will assume primary responsibility for DRB support.
Consequently, green ramp personnel must shift their training focus to the C-17. This includes sending personnel to Charleston AFB for training, in addition to ensuring maximum use of transient aircraft for ground training. Special Experience Identifiers (SEI) must be a priority when assigning new personnel, to help overcome the challenge of training on multiple airframes.
AMC should continue to focus on a new generation of MHE, in addition to pre-positioning support equipment at Pope AFB, such as aircraft tow bars, engine change equipment, and applicable test equipment.
Personnel assignments also represent a crucial piece of the readiness puzzle. The current policy to only assign second-term, or longer, aircraft maintainers to the 743 MXS is a success story in this area. AMC should also consider placing limits on the length of tour in primary outload support organizations, much like an overseas en route unit. Personnel also need the training advantage offered by the home station environment.
Notes
Chapter 6
Conclusion
"Tis time to leave the books in dust, And oil the unused armor's rust.
-Andrew Marvell
In September 1994, the NCA appeared convinced that a peaceful solution for restoring democracy in Haiti was not in the offing. The 82 nd Airborne DRB was alerted, and a task force was airborne in minimum time. However, the aircraft never reached Haiti. A clearly defined mission and organizational structure will ensure development of an effective inspection program designed to examine mission capability and support operations. In turn, the exercise program should focus on meeting established mission requirements, such as responsiveness to the DRB. Clear guidance in these areas will help facilitate development of effective training programs, equipment and infrastructure improvements, and personnel assignments focused on mission success.
In a time of fiscal constraint, and apparent uncertainty for the future of air mobility (and a rapid deployment force), these proposals may appear trivial. The importance of the DRB is often under appreciated during times of peace. At this very moment, a brigade of the 82 nd Airborne
Division stands ready to guard America's national interests. The organizations supporting green ramp represent a vital ingredient for ensuring this capability. An effective system must be inplace to determine their readiness. 
Notes
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